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Background: the road to invasion 
Since the establishing of the newly independent Cyprus the two communities and their 
motherlands have been working to destabilize the fragile socio-political situation of the 
island. After the 1960 constitution only 3 years were spent in a relative tranquillity but 
during that period of time the problems of the rigid and rapidly constructed constitutional 
order were able to seen for the wide public. The institution of the shared sovereignty was 
created to ensure the peace and the appropriate collaboration between the Greek- and the 
Turkish-Cypriot communities. However, this Utopia did not take into consideration the 
different perceptions of the two sides. After 1963 the Greek-Cypriot struggle for enosis1 
was getting to undermine this unbalanced socio-political environment.2 
The constitution provided exceptional rights for the minority Turkish-Cypriot 
community given the chance to defend them against encroachment by the Greek-Cypriot 
leadership. The Treaty of Guarantee provided recognition to the basic articles of the 
Constitution, required the Republic of Cyprus to maintain the state of affairs established by 
the treaties and also acknowledged the entitlement of three named Guarantor Powers, the 
United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey, jointly or separately to maintain the state of affairs 
being established. The Treaty of Establishment included the right of the United Kingdom to 
retain military base areas under British sovereignty. The Treaty of Alliance was signed by 
Greece, Turkey and Cyprus; they principally agreed to co-operate in their common defence. 
The main goal of these treaties was to ensure the political balance between the two 
communities and their motherlands. The possible military intervention of the guarantor 
nations given by the Treaty of Guarantee was limited for the 'reconstruction of the 
constitutional order' and nothing more.3 
By the middle of 1963 the constitutional machinery began to fall apart under the 
pressure of the competing Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot political interests. By November of 
1963 it was revealed that the constitution is simply unworkable. The Greek-Cypriot side 
intended to remove the 'obstacles' from the constitution such as the Turkish veto in 
1 Enosis was the main struggle of the Greek-Cypriot side means independence and union with Greece. 
2 Oliver P. Richmond: Ethno-Nationalism, Sovereignty and Negotiating Positions in the Cyprus 
Conflict: Obstacles to a Settlement. Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 35, No. 3 (Jul., 1999), pp. 42-63. 
3 Clement Dodd: The History and Politics of the Cyprus Conflict, Palgrave McMillan Ltd. (2010) 
London, pp.: 38-39. 
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legislative issues. This problem lead to inter-communal violence and ethnic clashes 
between the Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot people so the British troops intervened and 
establishing the so called green line to divide the capital and to provide the way to the 
United Nations Peace Keeping force (UNFICYP) which has remained ever since. Albeit the 
wide military action did not fulfil the British and UN hopes to put an end to the clashes. 
The fight renewed and the Turkish air force bombed the Greek-Cypriot military units 
concentrated around the established Turkish-Cypriot enclaves. The first Turkish plan of the 
Cyprus invasion was bom at that time and only the intense diplomatic pressure was able to 
prevent the wide-scale military action. Between 1964 and 1967 the Greek-Cypriot leader 
Makarios realized their enosis aspirations had been quite impractical and would mean war 
against Turkey. After archbishop Makarios convincible win at the 1968 president election a 
new era began. The rest of the Greek-Cypriot people disillusioned by the enosis and the 
economic fears were growing according to unite with the Greek military dictatorship. Also 
inter-communal talks set up by UN officials and lasted permanently until 1974. On the 
other hand the Greek military junta observed the turn of Makarios with an anxious eye. 
Since then the archbishop had to face with a systematic destabilization of his regime made 
by the Greek military dictatorship. Makarios returned the reliable general Grivas to lead the 
EOKA B but they had to fill the vacancies with Greek officers due to the lack of 
experienced Greek-Cypriot military officers. The temporary solution seemed adequate but 
the growing number of the enosis sympathisers among the military officers concerned huge 
problems. After Grivas death Makarios was well aware of the hardest point of the situation. 
He immediately demanded the withdrawal of the Greek officers from the National Guard 
on 2 July 1974 after all the archbishop knew the control of the Guard had fallen out from 
his hand. After his open letter to the Greek President Gizikis the coup was inevitable. On 15 
July 1974 the Cypriot National Guard led by its Greek officers overthrew the government 
and Makarios narrowly escaped from the death. After the attack of the presidential palace 
they installed a former EOKA gunman Nikos Sampson as a puppet president. This act was 
a perfect 'casus belli' for Bulent Ecevit, the Turkish prime minister for the military 
intervention and to establish some military presence on the island. According to the Treaty 
of Guarantee he appealed for British to give military assistance and when it was refused the 
Turkish troops were sent into Cyprus on 20 July.4 
The first invasion: establishing a bridgehead 
After the coup the Turkish military was preparing to the invasion according to the old 
1963 intervention plan. The Turkish navy and air force prepared with a synchronized attack 
and the first aim was to establish a defendable bridgehead in the Kyrenia region, the 
northern part of the island. In the early hours on 20 July the Turkish armed forces launched 
an amphibious invasion of Pentemilli located on the northern coastline, approximately 8 km 
west of the main harbour town of Kyrenia. It was clear that the first goal of the Turkish 
Head of Command was to force the Greek-Cypriot population to flee from the northern part 
4 David Souter: An Island Apart: A Review of the Cyprus Problem. Third World Quarterly, Vol. 6, 
No. 3 (Jul., 1984), pp. 661-664. 
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of the island. On the other hand paratrooper battalions were dropped near Nicosia in order 
to secure the main road from the capital to Kyrenia and support the Turkish-Cypriot 
enclaves.5 The Turkish paratrooper operation was a surprise for the Cypriot National Guard 
but in the first stage it failed to control the main road and to adequately support the 
enclaves. The National Guard deployed its best units near Famagusta trying to break down 
the resistance of the Turkish-Cypriot enclave.6 So the third Turkish strike was to demolish 
the bridgeheads of the CNG concentrated around Famagusta with many merciless air 
strikes. The CNG was quite divided and certain fractions could be seen into their rows after 
the coup. These fractions and unsteadiness posed several problems for CNG and definitely 
worsened its defence ability.7 Shortly after the first wave (which consisted approximately 
3000 troops) the second and main task force reached the northern coast near to Kyrenia 
harbour. Around noon the Greek-Cypriot mechanized units moved to Girne and Pontemili 
to destroy the Turkish bridgehead but they were pounded by the Turkish fighter-bombers 
caused fatal damages into the Greek-Cypriot units. At the afternoon the Greek-Cypriot 
started a counter-attack in order to engage the Turkish forces but they failed to achieve 
anything decisive. But surprisingly the night actions caused several friendly shot fired on 
the Turkish side killed some high ranked officers as well, which showed the confusion of 
the troops and the Turkish military control.8 At the end of the first day of invasion the 
Turkish army was successful in establishing a strong bridgehead (gained 300 km2 in the 
northern coast) and achieved the other major goal to force to flee the Greek-Cypriot 
population to the south. The Greek-Cypriot and Hellenic forces was able the encircled some 
enclaves, but with the lack of air cover they were not succeeded in rolling back 
significantly the invaders.9 
The second day started quite silent around the Turkish beachhead and during the day the 
second major wave departed from Turkey, on the other hand the Turkish Air Force 
commenced a heavy air campaign to block the Hellenic reinforcement and to cover the 
arrivals the second wave of troops. The Turkish road block between Kyrenia was attacked 
from Morphou and forced the invaders into a defensive position. The Greek-Cypriot 
5 The Cyprus National Guard High Command had planned a massive island-wide assault on the 
Turkish-Cypriot enclaves of Cyprus, in case of a Turkish invasion, so as to quickly eliminate these 
enclaves as potential footholds for a bridgehead. The initial plan - drawn up by general Grivas in 
1964 - was given the codename 'Aphrodite 1' and relied upon a full Greek division of 10,000 troops 
with heavy weapons. This division had been withdrawn from the island in 1967 thus a new plan was 
drawn up prior to 1974 named 'Aphrodite 2' and was to take the form of a major ground offensive 
against the enclaves instigated at the initiative of the Greek-Cypriots rather than the Greeks. This 
offensive should not be confused with the so-called 'Aphrodite 3' also called 'Hephaestus Plan', 
which was drawn to attack the presidential palace and remove Makarios from the power. 
6 Contrary to popular belief the biggest Turkish-Cypriot enclave was not in Famagusta. It was the 
Nicosia-St. Hilarion enclave (also called Giinyeli enclave) with its 25,000 population out of the total 
of 117,000 Turkish-Cypriots. 
7 Beside the CNG the Turkish forces had to take into consideration the well trained but lightly 
equipped ELDYK (ELliniki DYnami Kyprou), the Hellenic Contingent in Cyprus consists 1200 
troops. 
8 One of the officers who were killed by friendly fire was colonel Karaoglanoglu, the commander of 
the 50th infantry battalion. 
9 See: http://www.hellas.org/cyprus/timeline.htm, downloaded: 12 November 2012. 
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struggle to terminate the Turkish corridor between Kyrenia and Nicosia was not successful 
on the contrary the invaders were able to widen the corridor and to push back the CNG 
forces. Undoubtedly the most significant situation was of the day the Greek Cypriot Naval 
Command's delusive act. Turkish Air Force received reports of a Greek task force of ships 
off the coast of Paphos and assembled a force of around 28 strike aircraft to destroy the 
Hellenic force. This however was a deception and the radio signals transmitted by the 
Greek Cypriot Naval Command indicated that the three Turkish destroyers were in fact 
Greek war ships carrying support for the CNG. The strategy worked and the Turkish Air 
Force attacked their own vessels and even one of them sank during the air raid.10 In the 
evening the 'Operation Niki' started which covered the air transportation of the 35th 
Commando Unit from Greece to Cyprus as a strategic reserve for the future battles. The 
CNG needed help because on 22 July the second wave of Turkish amphibious force, the so 
called Bora Task Force arrived at Pentemilli including a whole tank company and a 
mechanized infantry. The troops of the Bora Task Force were sent to launch an offensive 
against Kyrenia and the merging of the bridgehead position with the Agyrta-Lefkosia 
enclave prior to the implementation of the cease-fire. The Greek-Cypriot High Command 
also sent strengthening to the Kyrenia region in order to build up a defensive line in the 
western part of the city but the CNG forces was overrun by the outnumbered Turkish 
troops. In the afternoon the invading units entered Kyrenia and divided into two separate 
forces in order to seek and set up a new bridgehead in the Kyrenia harbour for the 
forthcoming waves, while the other force marched to the Boghazi-Argypta pass to unite 
with the previously deployed paratroopers. The Turkish endeavour was successfully carried 
out by the troops and formed a stable bridgehead between Kyrenia and the village of 
Geunyeli which was a strategic position to possess the control over the Kyrenia-Nicosia 
corridor. At 4:00 p.m. the cease-fire supposed to start but the Turkish forces disregarded it 
and continued the air strike against the CNG positions near Kyrenia. At the airport of 
Nicosia took place a considerable fight to get the control of the landing fields. The military 
operation affected the nearly situated UN camp as well which concluded that the territory 
of the Nicosia Airport later declared as a United Nations Protected Area in order to secure 
the future transportations including the humanitarian aids as well.11 
Cease-fire and the first Geneva Conference 25-30 July 
Establishing a cease-fire was not an easy task considering the two opposite forces still 
had military operations after the cease-fire had declared. The United Kingdom, Greece and 
Turkey decided to enter into peace negotiations in order to restore the peace in the island 
and according to the Treaty of Guarantee to restore the constitutional order. The peace talks 
began in Geneva on the 25 July 1974 which also known as the Geneva Conferences. 
Callaghan represented the United Kingdom, Foreign Minister Turan Giines Turkey and 
Foreign Minister George Mavros Greece. After some argument the conference declared the 
10 The Turkish Navy destroyer Kocatepe is sunk, while the other two, the Adatepe and the Maresal 
Fevzi Cakmak suffered significant damage that renders them non-battle worthy. 
11 http://www.hellas.org/cyprus/timeline.htm 
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follows, "1. Recognition of the need to set in train as a matter of urgency, measures to 
adjust and to regularize, within a reasonable period of time, the situation in the Republic of 
Cyprus on a lasting basis. 2. No further extension of the areas controlled by the Turkish 
forces. 3. The establishment of a security zone at the limit of the areas occupied by the 
Turkish forces. 4. The evacuation of all Turkish (sic) enclaves occupied by Greek and 
Greek Cypriot forces, and the continuation of their protection by UNFICYP. 5. The release 
of military personnel detained by either side. 6. The elaboration of measures leading to the 
timely and phased reduction of the numbers of armed forces and of war material, 'within 
the framework of a just and lasting solution acceptable to all the parties concerned' 
[emphasis added], 7. The participation of representatives of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot 
communities in the further talks beginning in Geneva on 8 August. 8. The discussion at the 
forthcoming talks of, inter alia, the immediate return to constitutional legitimacy, the Vice-
President to resume his functions as under the 1960 Constitution."12 The five-day-long 
meeting contributed to the rapprochement between the two sides but we have to see that 
Turkey gained more then its counterpart. On one hand the linking of the timely and phased 
reduction of armed forces and war material with finding solution was really important for 
Turkey. On the other hand the agreement did not mention the protection of the Greek-
Cypriots who had to flee due to the invasion and had to leave their homes and the rest of 
their belongings. On third hand the agreement froze the military situation as far as the 
territorial questions are concerned given the chance to the Turkish army to reinforce their 
positions. The declaration of the Nicosia Airport as a UN Protected Area was taken into 
question by the Turkish delegation but Callaghan (and of course Kissinger) assured the 
parties that no advantage could be gained for the Greek troops due to the UN action.13 
During the first Geneva conference and between the end of the first and the beginning 
of the second invasion several clashes took place. Even a Turkish offensive carried out 
against the 'Karavas' defensive (areas of Laipthos-Karavas ) line of the Greek and Greek-
Cypriot troops on 6 August with significant air strike so the Greek forces had to retreat.14 
The second Geneva Conference 8 -14 August 
The meeting started with the participation of the representatives of the two communities 
and later on 10 August the leaders, Clerides and Dentktash joined to their delegations. The 
first conference left several problematic issues which were debated intensely at the second 
one. The most crucial point was to make it clear that the areas controlled by opposing 
forces should not be extended in order to avoid the further escalation and to halt the 
probable second invasion. The other requirement was the immediate evacuation of all 
Turkish enclaves occupied by Greek and Greek Cypriot forces which was the prior agenda 
of the Turkish. Unfortunately the biggest problem was that the cease-fire was not holding. 
Mavros the Greek Foreign Minister claimed that since 22 July cease-fire the Turkish troops 
12 Clement Dodd: The History and Politics of the Cyprus Conflict, op. cit. pp.: 118-119. 
13 Idem, pp.: 115-119. 
14 The Turkish military operations were made to prepare the eligible positions and to gain strategic 
advantage for the future attack. Sawas D. Vlassis: O Aporritos Attilas, Athens, 2004. 
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occupied more than 130km2 by 8 August totally disregarded the agreement. From the 
Turkish perspective they were stressed by the Turkish-Cypriot enclaves encircled by the 
CNG consisting some 81,000 people who were defenceless. Not surprisingly the meetings 
were characterized by the differences of the British and American opinions of how to 
prevent the following aggression on the island. The British imagination was to reinforce the 
UNFICYP troops and deploying fighter aircrafts in order to deter the next Turkish 
intervention which opinion was agreed by Kurt Waldheim the UN Secretary General as 
well.15 Kissinger considerably disagreed this imagination due to he got assurances from 
Ecevit to whom he had sent a massage to continue the peace talks and to refrain from any 
military action since he believed that there is a real possibility of moving the Turks off their 
idea of a single Turkish zone in Cyprus.16 
During the direct talks the Turkish opinion did not change so they want two federated 
states autonomous within their geographical boundaries. This meant two international 
identities and the loss of the 30% of the island as the Turkish delegation claimed. The 
Greek-Cypriot side could agree with the autonomy but only in communal and local matters 
but inside the Republic of Cyprus and not in a wholly separate state. As we can observe the 
two separate statements were pretty far from each other and at 2.25 a.m. on 14 August the 
conference broke up right after the Turkish Foreign Minister Giines had told on the 
telephone to Ecevit that 'Ayse is going on holiday', which meant to start the second 
invasion.17 
The second invasion: overrun and extending the bridgehead 
The new Turkish attack began almost two hours after the conference broke up. On 14 
August 1974 Turkish forces massively reinforced to the strength of two infantry divisions 
and supporting elements, commenced a second major offensive, codenamed Attila II. In the 
Eastern sector, the Turkish Navy, Air force and artillery started firing at the Greek coalition 
positions and extended the attack alongside the so called Mia Milia Greek-Cypriot 
Defensive Line. For security issues the UN troops were informed where the clear pathway 
through the minefields was in front of the defensive line. Probably from that source the 
Turkish army was also aware of the position of the clear road so they easily were able to 
attack the Greek coalition forces and forced them to withdraw to the thoroughly reinforced 
'Troodos line' near Famagusta. On the central sector the Turkish Air Force made a wide air 
raid against the ELDYK camp and after heavy ground attack took place but they were able 
to repel it. Except these few attacks no other major events happened in the central sector on 
the first day. In the western sector only a hilltop was occupied by the Turkish troops, but it 
had no major relevance. On the first day the Turkish forces' main strike was against the 
15 See the full report in: Jean Christou: Reporting in the Cyprus Mail, 12 February 2004. 
16 Düzgün, Basaran. Bir Tarihinn Tanig'indan Pilatus'un Gölgesinde (From a Witness of a Historical 
Event in the Shadow of Mount Pilatus). Girne, 2008. p.: 57. 
17 Clement Dodd: op. cit. pp.: 119-127. 
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eastern sector in order to reach Famagusta on the forthcoming days and to liberate the 
town.18 
On the second day, 15 August in the eastern sector the Greek coalition forces halted 
along the Troodos line and holding the defence line west of Famagusta. In the afternoon the 
advancing Turkish troops entered Famagusta and united with the Turkish-Cypriot units but 
surprisingly did not enter the Greek-Cypriot district of the town which was completely 
undefended. At that time heavy exchange of fire took place in the central sector but there 
was no other significant event. The invaders had a little bit bigger success in the western 
sector where they gained a total 6 km advance to the west made the Greek coalition forces 
to retreat to the Troodos Line in this sector as well. The last day preserved a major 
offensive in the central sector. In the morning of 16 August the Turkish infantry covered by 
artillery and the Air Force attacked the ELDYK camp. In the afternoon the Greek forces 
facing defeat were ordered to withdraw through the Turkish lines but the casualties were 
very significant on both sides. The Turkish final assault was successful and they occupied 
the complete area of the camp.19 
The invaders' attack continued southwards and assaulted a Greek battalion inside 
Nicosia but only achieved 100 metres advance. The northern part of Nicosia during a tank-
to-tank battle a Turkish M47 tank was destroyed by the two Greek-Cypriot T34 tanks. 
Meanwhile in the western sector the whole CNG had retreated to the Troodos Line which 
meant to give up Morphou and several villages. At noon Morphou captured by the Turkish 
troops and 6 p.m. the last town in front of the Troodos Line, Limnitis had also been 
occupied by the invaders right before the UN instituted a cease-fire. Having disregarded the 
UN declaration both sides continued advancing and did not stop the military operations. 
However the opposite forces did not make much effort to carry out an offensive or a single 
attack. To put it blunt the Greek-Cypriot CNG was heavily weakened, suffered from 
desertations and poor discipline so the Troodos Line would not have been able to repel a 
strong Turkish attack. This offensive lasted three days and caused the defences of the CNG 
to collapse, leading to the capture of the towns of Famagusta, Morphou, and the northern 
quarter of Nicosia. Not to mention the huge demographic catastrophe and the high number 
of casualties.20 
Consequences of the invasion 
The invasion has had disastrous consequences claiming about 142,000 Greek-Cypriots21 
living in the north were expelled from the occupied northern part of the island where they 
constituted 80% of the population. These people are still deprived of the right to return to 
their homes and properties. A further 20,000 Greek Cypriots enslaved in the occupied area 
were gradually forced through intimidation and denial of their basic human rights to 
18 http://www.ELDYK74.gr: ETOPIKO TOY XYAAOTOY, downloaded: 7 July 2012. 
19 Ioannis Mamounidakis: Armour in Cyprus. Evolution and Action. 2008. 
20 http://www.acig.org/artman/publish/article_296.shtml, downloaded: 1 July 2012. 
21 This means nearly one quarter of the total population of Cyprus. 
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abandon their homes.22 These facts show us the brutality of the invasion and we should not 
forget that one of the main goals of the invasion was to force the Greek-Cypriot population 
in the north to flee to the southern part of the island.23 
The Greek Cypriots were deeply disappointed by the Turkish action, and almost all 
believed that the United States was responsible for the entire events of 1974. The popular 
belief was that the CIA was behind the coup that stood Makarios aside, and that the US 
Government was aware that after the coup a Turkish invasion would follow and did nothing 
to prevent it. It was also believed that an American objective was to divide Cyprus between 
Greece and Turkey, thus extending NATO and American air bases to the island. If this goal 
could not be achieved, the American aim was to control Cyprus through a puppet 
government, and bring the island firmly within the NATO alliance, establishing at the same 
time American air and military bases on it.24 Considering the opinion of Kissinger during 
the first Geneva Conference when highly disagreed with the reinforcement of the 
UNFICYP troops and the British deterrent actions this belief seems quite logic. 
Beside the demographic disaster and the shadow of the alleged US machination the 
invasion caused a major economic loss as well. One third of the active population became 
unemployed and the island lost the 65% of the tourist accommodation capacity, 83% of the 
general cargo at Famagusta port, 40% of school buildings, 56% of mining and quarrying 
output, 46% of the industrial production and 20% of the state forests. However theses 
losses shared inappropriate between the two parts. The Turkish occupied area accounted for 
46% of crop production and much higher percentages of citrus fruit production of 79%, 
cereals production of 8%, and tobacco production of 100%. Turkey has also promoted the 
demographic change of the occupied territory through the implantation of Anatolian 
settlers. After the invasions approximately 115,000 Turks have been imported to the 
occupied area from Turkey cause not only demographic but long lasting economic 
discrepancies as well. The excessive number of Turkish settlers contributed to the high rate 
of unemployment and some unsatisfactory among the Turkish-Cypriot community.25 
The 1974 invasion is still both explicitly and implicitly the main reason for the Greek-
Cypriot side to protest against any international peace solution or other offer to create bi-
communal and bi-zonal federation with two international personality. The military 
intervention has showed up the biggest source of political and social debates which 
worsened after the self declaration of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in 1983. 
The island is still divided not only physically and politically but also in the hearths and 
minds of the Cypriot people. The everlasting offendedness of both communities is fairly 
understandable and no international - whether came from the UN or from the EU - peace 
endeavour has been succeeded. Neither the Annan plan nor the 'power of attraction' of the 
EU brought major breakthrough for the island's life. I am confident the solution of this 
problem is so complex that not only one factor could be taken into consideration. The 
ethno-nationalism the future economic and political state and attitude of the EU would also 
be key elements according to the Cyprus problem, but the crucial point is the relation 
22 Today there are fewer than 600 enslaved persons (Greek Cypriots and Maronites). 
23 http://www.cyprusnet.com/content.php?article_id=2794&subject=standalone, downloaded: 7 July 
2012. 
24 Clement Dodd: op. cit. p.: 129. 
25 http://www.cyprusnet.com/content.php?article_id=2794&subject=standalone 
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between the EU and Turkey. It goes without saying that the Turkish attitude to the conflict 
solution in the island has been the inevitable point. Considering the EU accession of Turkey 
it might be a spark for the solution of the Cyprus problem but regarding the proceedings 
between the European Union and the Turkish administration it unlikely will ever take place. 
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1. Map: The Attila I. operation. Source: 
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2. Map: The Attila I. operation. Source: 
http://www.acig.org/artman/publish/article 296.shtml 
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3. Map: Cyprus after the 1974 Turkish invasion divided by the 'Green Line'. Source: 
Clement Dodd: op.cit. 
